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(1) Whether student speech outside the school setting is governed by Tinker v. Des Moines 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) and its progeny?  
 
(2) If so, whether application of the Tinker standard and its progeny allow Respondent’s speech 
to be regulated by Petitioner, the Nero School District?  
  
ii 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
Plaintiff-respondent in the proceedings below was Michael Naranjo.  
Defendant-petitioner in the proceedings below was the Nero Unified School District. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES  










The court of appeals entered judgment on March 16, 2016. (R. at 22). Petitioner filed a 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari on April 15, 2016. (R. at 23). This Court granted the Petition on 
January 6, 2016. (R. at 24). This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2012). A 
district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are reviewed 
for clear error. Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nero Unified School District (“Petitioner”) indefinitely suspended Respondent, Michael 
Naranjo (“Naranjo”), for refusing to delete a Facebook group Naranjo created off campus. (R. at 
2). Naranjo is an eighteen-year-old senior at Nero High School, and an excellent student, athlete, 
and leader. (R. at 3, 6). Naranjo created the Facebook group—“Nero is Anti-Gay”—to protest 
Petitioner’s hiring of a teacher who writes an anti-LGBT blog, and to provide a forum for other 
students to express opinions on the matter. (R. at 2, 6).  
While Naranjo never advertised, displayed, or accessed the group on campus, the group 
grew in popularity and Nero High School’s entire senior class and some underclassmen joined 
the group. (R. at 6, 21). Facebook is not affiliated with Naranjo or Petitioner, and Naranjo had no 
control over the various expressions other students posted. (R at 6, 8, 16) Further, Naranjo had 
no control over students accessing the group on campus, or the unknown student who brought 
one of Naranjo’s drawings to campus. (R. at 7).  
Following complaints from a few parents and students, Petitioner requested Naranjo 
delete the Facebook group and its content, or face indefinite suspension. (R. at 2, 9, 21). Naranjo 
refused, and after two weeks, Petitioner indefinitely suspended Naranjo. (R. at 2, 12, 16, 21).  In 
protest, Naranjo created a second Facebook group, which other students have refrained from 
joining out of fear of punishment from Petitioner. (R. at 2.) Further, Naranjo filed a complaint 
with the United States District Court for the Southern District of Everystate seeking—among 
other things—an order enjoining Petitioner from enforcing the suspension. (R. at 4). Applying 
the test established in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, the district court found 
Naranjo was unlikely to succeed on the merits of the claim and denied Naranjo’s request for a 
preliminary injunction. (R. at 17-18). 
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Following the district court’s denial, Naranjo filed a notice of appeal with the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifteenth Circuit. (R. at 19). The Fifteenth Circuit granted appeal 
and considered whether Tinker and its progeny may govern off-campus student speech, and if so, 
whether applying Tinker and its progeny allow Petitioner to regulate Naranjo’s speech. (R. at 
20). The Fifteenth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s ruling, and ordered the 
district court to apply the First Amendment. (R. at 22). The Fifteenth Circuit found Tinker and its 
progeny did not apply to Naranjo’s case and, therefore, the court declined to address whether 
Tinker’s analysis permitted Petitioner to regulate Naranjo’s speech. (R. at 22). 
This Court granted certiorari to determine whether Tinker and its progeny may govern 
off-campus student speech, and if so, whether applying Tinker’s standard allows Petitioner to 
regulate Naranjo’s speech. (R. at 24). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. The court of appeals correctly held that the First Amendment—not Tinker and its 
progeny—should govern the analysis of Naranjo’s Facebook group and drawing. Applying 
Tinker to Naranjo’s off-campus speech goes against Tinker’s purpose—to protect students in 
light of the special characteristics of the school environment.  Further, because Naranjo’s speech 
addresses the hiring practices of a public school district—a matter of public concern—Naranjo’s 
speech is entitled to the First Amendment’s highest level of protection and should not be limited 
by Tinker. Finally, extending Tinker’s reach off campus will impede Tinker’s protective purpose 
by silencing students and exposing schools to greater harm. Therefore, this Court should uphold 
the court of appeals’ decision and issue the requested preliminary injunction, or remand the 
matter for further proceedings governed by the First Amendment. 
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II. If Tinker and its progeny are applied, Petitioner is not permitted to regulate Naranjo’s 
speech because Naranjo’s speech did not cause a substantial disruption to the school 
environment or interfere with the rights of others. Petitioner’s delay in disciplinary action 
evidences the slight and immaterial impact of Naranjo’s speech on the school environment. 
Equating the complaints of a few parents and students with the violence forecasted in Bell v. 
Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd. and Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. trivializes the disruptions the 
Tinker standard was enacted to prevent. Further, Naranjo’s indefinite suspension is 
disproportionate to the alleged harm caused to the school environment. Finally, Tinker’s purpose 
is to enable school administrators to preserve the school environment and protect the rights of 
students without violating the First Amendment. Petitioner has not acted to protect the school 
environment but rather to preserve Petitioner’s public image at the expense of Naranjo’s 
education and future. If this Court applies Tinker and its progeny, the Court should find that 
Naranjo’s actions did not substantially disrupt the school environment or interfere with the rights 
of others, and issue the requested relief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION TO APPLY THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT—NOT TINKER AND ITS PROGENY—IS CORRECT, BECAUSE 
NARANJO’S SPEECH OCCURRED OFF CAMPUS, ADDRESSED A MATTER 
OF PUBLIC CONCERN, AND, PUNISHING NARANJO’S SPEECH WOULD 
IMPEDE TINKER’S GOAL OF PROTECTING STUDENTS IN LIGHT OF THE 
SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SCHOOL ENVIRONMENT 
 
Tinker should not apply to speech originating off-campus—especially if the speech is 
non-violent or addresses a matter of political concern. The First Amendment guarantees freedom 
from laws abridging the right to free speech. U.S. Const. amend. I. One of Tinker’s fundamental 
principles is that students and teachers do not shed First Amendment rights to free speech at the 
schoolhouse gate. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
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Tinker does not give schools absolute authority or the right to censor student speech at will. Id. at 
511. Rather, Tinker allows schools—under narrowly tailored circumstances—to discipline 
students for speech which either substantially disrupts the school environment or interferes with 
the rights of others. Id. at 506. Tinker provides an avenue—in light of the special characteristics 
of the school—for schools to protect students entrusted to the school’s care. That said, because 
Tinker necessarily limits students’ rights, Tinker’s application must be controlled. Allowing 
Petitioner to discipline Naranjo for non-violent off-campus speech addressing a matter of 
political concern, goes beyond Tinker’s necessary limits and, therefore, this Court should affirm 
the court of appeals’ decision that Tinker does not apply. 
A. Tinker Should Not Apply To Off-Campus Speech Unless The Speech Forecasts A 
Threat Of On-Campus Violence 
 
Naranjo’s speech should not be analyzed under the Tinker standard because Naranjo’s 
speech occurred off campus. Naranjo’s position as a student at Nero High School does not 
automatically classify everything Naranjo says as school speech governed by Tinker. Tinker’s 
reach must be limited. To date, this Court has limited Tinker to speech occurring in primary or 
secondary school environments. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007) (allowing 
schools to limit speech promoting harmful activity—specifically, illegal drug use—in a 
secondary school environment); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 275 (1988) 
(allowing schools to limit speech releasing students’ sensitive information in a school 
newspaper); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (permitting schools to 
limit lewd, vulgar, or profane speech occurring on campus). Because Naranjo created the 
Facebook group and drawing off campus, and because Naranjo never intended the group or 
drawing to reach the campus, this Court should not apply Tinker. 
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By allowing regulation of certain types of on-campus speech, Tinker provides a way to 
protect students in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. Morse, 551 U.S. 
at 424 (Alito, J., concurring). The special characteristics of the school environment place 
children together in close quarters under the guidance and supervision of teachers, who educate, 
discipline, and protect students. Id. The nature of the controlled environment demands the school 
place the physical safety and well being of students above all other rights. Id. Therefore, school 
administrators have latitude to run the school as necessary, provided the school’s arm of 
authority does not extend off campus. See Thomas v. Bd. of Ed., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 
F.2d 1043, 1044 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding disciplinary action for an off-campus student newspaper 
must conform to the restrictions of the First Amendment—not Tinker). 
That said, the school environment’s special characteristics and educational mission are 
not synonymous. Morse, 551 U.S. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring). The special characteristics of the 
school environment encompass the school’s responsibility and control over students’ physical 
safety. Id. at 424. Conversely, schools define the educational mission on a state-by-state and 
school-by-school basis. Id. at 423. For example, some schools may define the educational 
mission as directing students toward certain political, social, or religious views. Id. Allowing 
schools to hide behind Tinker while punishing students for any statement conflicting with the 
broadly defined educational mission of the school, exceeds Tinker’s scope. Therefore, Tinker 
should be limited to protecting the school environment in light of the special characteristics of 
the school, not the school’s educational mission. While Petitioner has broad power to sculpt the 
school’s educational mission, Petitioner cannot use Tinker to justify silencing Naranjo for mere 
critiques. 
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In Boucher, a student was suspended for writing an article teaching students to hack the 
school’s computer system. Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 823 
(7th Cir. 1998). The Boucher court distinguished the student’s article from a mere critique of the 
school because the article included a call to action allowing school administrators to reasonably 
forecast harm to school property. Id. at 828. Conversely, Naranjo’s Facebook group and drawing 
merely critique Petitioner’s hiring practices.  Naranjo has not called students to action allowing 
Petitioner to forecast harm to school property, or the lives of other students. Instead, Naranjo 
made available a forum for students to critique Petitioner’s anti-LGBT hiring practices. Tinker 
allows Petitioner to correct conduct, which substantially disrupts the school environment, not 
beliefs contrary to Petitioner’s own. 
Tinker’s protection of the special characteristics of the school environment allows 
regulating conduct, not belief. In Morse, this Court found that disciplining a student for a sign 
advocating illegal drug use was proper under Tinker’s standard of analysis. Morse, 551 U.S. at 
409. That said, Justices Alito and Kennedy indicated in Justice Alito’s concurring opinion that 
had the student’s message gone beyond advocating conduct to addressing belief—specifically, 
the legalization of drugs—Tinker would not permit censorship. See Id. at 422 (5-4 decision) 
(Alito, J., concurring) (indicating speech regarding the legalization of drugs is political, beyond 
Tinker’s reach, and would alter the Court’s holding). While schools may regulate student speech 
promoting conduct threatening the special characteristics of the school environment, schools may 
not become enclaves of totalitarianism—regulating speech that does not conform to the school’s 
approved beliefs. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. Naranjo’s speech addressed the belief that Petitioner 
was wrong to hire a teacher with an anti-LGBT blog. While Naranjo’s belief may directly 
conflict with Petitioner’s position, Petitioner may not regulate Naranjo’s speech merely because 
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the speech advances a belief with which Petitioner does not wish to contend. Burnside v. Byars, 
363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966). Punishing students for interrupting class, addresses conduct 
essential to preserving special characteristics of the school environment. Id. at 748. Indefinitely 
suspending Naranjo for creating an off-campus Facebook group regulates belief, which is outside 
Tinker’s standard of review, and, therefore, violates the First Amendment. 
Finally, if this Court determines Tinker’s reach may extend off campus, these rare 
circumstances should be limited to speech threatening physical safety. While applying Tinker to 
off-campus speech presents a matter of first impression for this Court, lower courts have applied 
Tinker to off-campus speech forecasting on-campus violence. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. 
Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 393 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016) 
(forecasting on-campus violence against a coach through a rap song); Wynar v. Douglas Cty. 
Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2013) (suspending a student for sending messages 
threatening on-campus violence against students and teachers via Myspace). In comparison, 
Naranjo’s speech occurred off campus, only made its way to campus through the acts of another 
student, and did not cause physical harm to students or teachers. Stretching Tinker beyond the 
schoolhouse gate should impose a higher burden on Petitioner to establish that inaction would 
expose students to catastrophic harm. Petitioner cannot meet this burden. Therefore, this Court 
should find Tinker’s analysis unsuitable when applied to Naranjo’s non-violent, off-campus 
speech. 
B. Tinker Should Not Apply To Political Speech Addressing A Matter Of Public 
Concern. 
 
While violent speech may warrant extending Tinker’s reach off campus, political 
speech—both on and off campus—should receive greater levels of protection. In Burnside, the 
court held that the First Amendment protects communicating matters of public concern against 
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infringement by state officials such as public schools. See Burnside, 363 F.2d at 749 
(disciplining students for wearing buttons promoting civil rights activism violates students’ First 
Amendment rights). Further, in Phelps, the Court acknowledged that political speech on a matter 
of public concern merits the highest level of protection under the First Amendment. Snyder v. 
Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)). Political 
speech addressing a matter of public concern should exceed Tinker’s authority. Naranjo is 
dissatisfied with Petitioner’s hiring practices—a matter of public concern—and Naranjo is 
providing a forum for other concerned citizens to express dissatisfaction. Therefore, this Court 
should find that Naranjo’s political speech evades Tinker’s authority. 
Addressing dissatisfaction with current conditions is one of the primary functions of 
political speech. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). Naranjo and other students 
participated in the Facebook group because of dissatisfaction with Petitioner’s hiring practices. 
Petitioner’s response attempts to silence dissenting opinions by threatening suspension. 
Petitioner acts to preserve public image and political will at the expense of Naranjo’s rights and 
future—a future Petitioner has a privilege to foster and duty to protect. This is not to argue that 
Naranjo’s right to political speech is limitless even off campus, only that Naranjo’s speech is 
distinct from the “substantive evil” standard of Terminiello or the hate speech allowed in Phelps. 
See Phelps, 562 U.S. at 443 (permitting the church to picket a soldier’s funeral with anti-
homosexual signs because the speech addressed a matter of public concern); Terminiello, 337 
U.S. at 4 (censoring speech requires evidence of a clear and present danger of serious substantive 
evil rising far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest). Naranjo’s Facebook group 
may be an annoyance, and complaints from parents and students may signal unrest, but political 
criticism of Petitioner’s hiring practices can hardly be classified as “substantively evil.”  
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Finally, In Tinker, the school violated the students’ First Amendment rights by 
suspending students for wearing armbands protesting the Vietnam War—the 1960’s seminal 
political issue. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. Similarly, gay rights occupy a prominent platform in 
today’s political climate. In Phelps, members of Westboro Baptist Church held signs thanking 
God for dead soldiers—alleged evidence of God’s judgment on America’s pro-homosexual 
culture. Phelps, 562 U.S. at 447. The Phelps Court held that because the signs addressed a matter 
of public concern—gay rights—the church was entitled to the highest levels of protection 
available under the First Amendment. Id. at 444. Because Naranjo’s drawing and Facebook 
group address the implications of a prominent political issue on a public school district’s hiring 
practices, Naranjo’s speech deserves the First Amendment’s highest protection.  
C. Punishing Naranjo Will Make It More Difficult To Preserve The Special 
Characteristics Of The School Environment And Protect Students In The Future. 
 
Compelling Naranjo to remove the Facebook group to protect the special characteristics 
of the school environment, actually exposes the school to greater harm. Students play a vital role 
in school safety because students are often the first to know of pending danger. In Wynar, the 
school became aware of a threat of on-campus violence because concerned students informed a 
teacher of a student’s violent Myspace messages. Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1066. In Bell, Justice 
Dennis’ dissent addresses the silencing effect that disciplinary actions can have on students’ 
willingness to expose on-campus threats like sexual harassment. See Bell, 799 F.3d 379, 403 
(Dennis, J., dissenting) (addressing a matter of public concern entitled the student to higher 
protection as a whistleblower exposing sexual harassment by a school coach). Unfortunately, 
Petitioner’s overreaching disciplinary action may silence student whistleblowers and impede 
Petitioner’s duty to protect students. 
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Suspending Naranjo has silenced student speech at Nero High School. While the entire 
senior class joined “Nero is Anti-Gay,” students have not joined Naranjo’s second Facebook 
group—protesting Petitioner’s punishment—because students fear being suspended for 
participating. Protecting the special characteristics of the school environment requires students 
feel safe to speak out against wrongdoing and injustice. Suspending Naranjo in hopes of 
preserving Petitioner’s public image exposes Nero High School to greater harm. The delicate 
balance between school discipline and student speech should err on the side promoting student 
speech because student silence opens the door for catastrophic harm. Therefore, this Court 
should find Tinker does not apply to Naranjo’s off-campus speech. 
II. IF TINKER IS APPLIED, NARANJO’S SPEECH DOES NOT VIOLATE 
TINKER’S STANDARD BECAUSE NARANJO’S SPEECH DOES NOT BREACH 
TINKER’S MINIMUM THRESHOLD, PETITIONER’S ACTIONS CONFIRM 
NARANJO’S SPEECH HAD MINIMAL IMPACT ON THE SCHOOL 
ENVIRONMENT, AND NARANJO’S SPEECH DOES NOT FIT AN 
ESTABLISHED TINKER EXCEPTION. 
 
Violating Tinker’s standard requires evidence of substantial disruption to the school 
environment or interference with the rights of others. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. Even if Tinker is 
applied to Naranjo’s off-campus speech, this Court should find that Naranjo’s speech did not 
violate Tinker’s standard. In finding Naranjo’s speech did not violate Tinker’s standard, this 
Court will further solidify Tinker’s narrowly tailored scope and protect students’ First 
Amendment rights. While other courts have held students’ First Amendment rights are not 
necessarily co-extensive with the rights of adults in other settings, schools still must balance 
protecting the school environment while respecting fundamental rights. Bell, 799 F.3d at 682; 
LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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A. Naranjo’s Speech Does Not Violate Tinker’s Minimum Threshold Because Naranjo’s 
Speech Is Merely Unpleasant To Some. 
 
Courts applying Tinker have not crafted bright line definitions of substantial disruption or 
interference with the rights of others, preferring instead to apply Tinker on a case-by-case basis, 
looking at all surrounding circumstances. Lavine, 257, F.3d at 989. Regardless, some 
substantially disruptive circumstances require little qualification. See Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1072 
(perpetrating an on-campus shooting represents quintessential interference with the rights of 
other students). By contrast, some situations—although uncomfortable—do not rise to the level 
of violating Tinker’s standard. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (regulating contrary viewpoints 
merely because the speech is unpopular or unpleasant, is not permitted). Further, student speech 
does not cause a substantial disruption with the school environment or interference with the 
rights of others merely because the speech offends some listener. See C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 
4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1152 (9th Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed, 85 U.S.L.W. 3368 (U.S. Jan. 24, 
2017) (No. 16-940) (noting speech which is “merely offensive to some listener” does not 
constitute a substantial disruption or interference with the rights of others under Tinker (citing 
Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3d Cir. 2001))). A few complaints from 
parents, teachers, and students indicate that although some may find Naranjo’s viewpoint 
unpleasant, Naranjo’s speech does not breach the minimum threshold of substantial disruption or 
interference with the rights of others. Further, Petitioner’s delayed response affirms the minimal 
impact Naranjo’s speech had on the school environment. 
B. Petitioner’s Delay And Severity Of Punishment Contradict Allegations That 
Naranjo’s Speech Caused Substantial Disruption Under Tinker’s Standard Of 
Analysis. 
 
Petitioner’s disciplinary delay indicates Petitioner does not regard the complaints of a few 
students, parents, and teachers, as a substantial disruption to the school environment. A 
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substantial disruption with the special characteristics of the school environment interferes with 
the school to such a degree that the school is unable to fulfill its purpose until the disruption is 
corrected. See Bell, 799 F.3d at 399 (threatening speech destroys the ability to teach and, 
therefore, the school’s purpose). Some states, recognizing the need to equip schools to quickly 
respond to threats and regain control of the school environment have passed statutes permitting 
emergency expulsion. See LaVine, 257 F.3d at 990 (applying a Washington statute permitting 
emergency expulsion for threats of substantial disruption to the educational environment). True 
substantial disruptions demand an immediate response to regain control of the school 
environment. Petitioner claims Naranjo created a substantial disruption on campus and yet took 
no disciplinary action against Naranjo for two weeks.  
Substantial disruptions demand immediate reactions. In LaVine, the student argued that 
the school’s punishment was merely retributive and would jeopardize the student’s future 
military employment. Id. at 986. The LaVine court reasoned that the immediacy of the school’s 
response to the student’s threat of violence, substantiated the school’s interest in preventing 
disruption. See Id. at 991 (calling a school counselor and convening a meeting of school officials 
immediately after discovering a student’s violent poem substantiated the school’s intent to 
protect the school, not punish the student). Further, in Bell, the court determined the primary 
purpose for extending Tinker to off-campus speech is to allow school administrators to react 
quickly to perceived threats against students and faculty. Bell, 799 F.3d at 393.  
Petitioner tarried because Naranjo’s speech did not substantially disrupt the school 
environment or interfere with the rights of others. If Naranjo’s speech violated Tinker’s standard, 
Petitioner would not have allowed the disruption to linger for fourteen days. Petitioner gave 
Naranjo time to consider the pending indefinite suspension to coerce Naranjo into removing a 
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message with which Petitioner does not wish to contend. Therefore, Petitioner’s actions defy 
Tinker’s intended purpose—to protect the school environment—and indicate Naranjo’s speech 
did not cause a substantial disruption.  
Further, the severity of Naranjo’s punishment as compared to moderate responses in 
other cases reveals Petitioner’s goal was preserving public image—not protecting the school 
environment from substantial disruption. In Wisniewski, a student was suspended for a drawing 
depicting the death of a teacher. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 
F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2007). The student’s suspension lasted for one semester during which time 
the district provided alternative education and permitted the student to rejoin the class the 
following semester. Id. at 37. Similarly, the catastrophic harm forecast in Bell and Wynar—on-
campus violence—was also met with temporary suspensions. Bell, 799 F.3d at 385; Wynar, 728 
F.3d at 1070.  
The few complaints Petitioner received from parents, students, and teachers, cannot rival 
the threat of potential on-campus violence. Yet, Naranjo’s punishment—indefinite suspension 
without alternative education—is more severe. Naranjo’s suspension will last until Naranjo 
deletes the Facebook group and the group’s content, or this Court enjoins Petitioner from 
enforcing the suspension. This is not punishment, but coercion. Petitioner’s goal is not securing 
and protecting the educational environment, but preserving Petitioner’s public image by forcing 
Naranjo to relent.  
Finally, in LaVine, the school’s emergency expulsion letter threatened the student’s 
chances for military employment. LaVine, 257 F.3d at 986. Because the emergency expulsion’s 
purpose was protecting the school environment, the school revised the expulsion letter to help 
preserve the student’s future military prospects. Id. Indefinitely suspending Naranjo—a high 
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school senior—threatens Naranjo’s ability to graduate. Unlike the school in LaVine, Petitioner’s 
actions preserve public image at the expense of Naranjo’s future. Further, Petitioner’s actions 
send a message to students who dare speak out against Petitioner in the future. Petitioner hides 
self-preservation under a cloak of substantial disruption. Applying Tinker will encourage other 
schools to do the same, turning educational environments into enclaves of totalitarianism.  
C. Naranjo Should Not Be Punished Under An Established Tinker Exception, Or For 
The Conduct Of Other Students.  
 
To date, this Court has addressed three specific categories of speech, which permit school 
censorship without requiring evidence of actual or reasonably forecasted disruption. Bell, 799 
F.3d at 391; See, e.g., Morse, 551 U.S. at 425 (regulating on-campus speech threatening physical 
safety) (Alito, J., concurring); Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271 (permitting the school to regulate 
student speech reasonably perceived to bear the imprimatur of the school); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 
683 (holding lewd, indecent, or offensive speech causes substantial disruption within the school 
environment). Arguing that Naranjo’s speech violated one of Tinker’s exceptions fails because 
Naranjo’s speech cannot be classified as lewd, bearing the imprimatur of the school, or 
threatening physical harm to students. 
First, Classifying Naranjo’s speech as “lewd” under Fraser’s standard ignores the fact 
that Naranjo’s intended audiences were voluntary participants in the Facebook group. Students 
willingly joining and voluntarily contributing to a Facebook group are different from students 
subjected to speech at mandatory school assemblies. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677. Second, suggesting 
Naranjo’s Facebook group bore the imprimatur of the school implies people reasonably believed 
“Nero is Anti-Gay” spoke on Petitioner’s behalf. A school-sponsored publication created and 
distributed on campus, is reasonably understood to speak on behalf of the school. Kuhlmeier, 484 
U.S. at 271. Believing Naranjo’s Facebook group—created off-campus and open to the public—
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speaks on behalf of a public high school merely because a portion of the school’s name appears 
in the group title is a tenuous and unreasonable connection. Third, Naranjo’s speech cannot be 
classified as a threat to physical safety under Morse because Naranjo’s speech does not advocate 
illegal drug use or forecast on-campus violence. Morse, 551 U.S. at 424 (Alito, J., concurring). 
Therefore, Petitioner cannot justify violating Naranjo’s First Amendment rights by classifying 
Naranjo’s speech under one of Tinker’s narrow exceptions. 
Finally, arguing Naranjo’s speech should be considered on-campus speech because 
Naranjo’s drawing was found on campus and because students accessed the group from campus, 
fails because it punishes Naranjo for the actions of other students. In Porter, a student was 
suspended when the student’s violent drawing was brought to campus by the student’s younger 
brother. Porter v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 612 (5th Cir. 2004). The Porter court 
held the drawing did not constitute on-campus student speech because the drawing was 
completed at home and the student never intended the drawing to reach the campus. Id. at 615. 
Similarly, in Blue Mountain, a student was suspended for creating an explicit drawing of the 
school’s principal off-campus. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 921 
(3d Cir. 2011). The Blue Mountain court reasoned that the student’s off-campus speech did not 
become on-campus speech merely because another student printed and brought the drawing to 
campus. Id. at 933. Here, Naranjo created a Facebook group and drawing off campus and never 
accessed, or distributed the group’s content on campus. Naranjo’s drawing was only found on 
campus because of the unilateral acts of another student. Further, Naranjo had no control over 
students who accessed or discussed the group on campus. Therefore, this Court should find 
Naranjo’s speech does not constitute on-campus student speech, and refuse to allow Naranjo to 
be punished for the actions of other students. 
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CONCLUSION 
Tinker should not govern this Court’s analysis because Naranjo’s Facebook group and 
drawing were created off-campus and address a political issue of public concern. Applying 
Tinker to Naranjo’s speech requires widening Tinker’s scope beyond the tolerances of the First 
Amendment and would lead to a progressive atrophy of First Amendment rights. If this Court 
expands Tinker’s scope, the expansion should be limited to off-campus speech permitting a 
reasonable forecast of on-campus violence.  
Even if applied, Tinker’s standard is not violated because Naranjo’s speech did not cause 
a substantial disruption to the special characteristics of the school environment or interfere with 
the rights of others. Therefore, this Court should affirm the court of appeals’ judgment. 
For these reasons, Naranjo prays this Court affirm the judgment of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifteenth Circuit, and issue the requested preliminary injunction, or, 
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